During the months of economic hardship, riots, rapes, disappearances, and peaceful protests that led to the resignation of Suharto from his three-decade presidency of Indonesia, opposition groups coalesced around the primary theme of reformasi (reform) and a singular goal of dethroning the dictator. On May 21, 1998, the latter goal was accomplished when Suharto ceded power to his hand-picked vice president, B.J. Habibie. A consensus on precisely what reformasi would entail, however, has been far more elusive. Since Suharto's fall, Indonesia has witnessed a bewildering array of violence, pacification, arming, disarming, courts-martial, name-calling, ninja-style killings, political party launchings, and quite surprisingly free, fair, and violence-free parliamentary elections in June 1999. The elections bode well for reformasi. However, there is little consensus on what a post-reformasi Indonesia should look like. With the emergence of a press that has more freedom than it did during Suharto's New Order era (1966-1998), there have been lively public debates regarding the nature of electoral laws, the requirements for clean governance, and the development of responsive institutions that would not allow power to be monopolized by an autocrat such as Suharto. In terms of civil-military relations, reformasi led to some very real changes that have shifted some power away from the military and toward institutions that are probably more ready for reform in the near-term than the military. Despite widespread recognition inside and outside the military that its role has to change under more open, democratic governance, there remains equally widespread ambivalence toward tackling any significant reform of the military by members of the military leadership and political leaders. This paper will explain the convoluted course of civil-military relations in the reformasi era of contemporary Indonesia and will do so by placing these developments in comparative perspective.